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DIVIDED LOYALTIES: ETHICAL CHALLENGES FOR AMERICA’S LAW 
ENFORCEMENT IN POST 9/11 AMERICA 
By Cynthia A. Brown, J.D., Ph.D.* 
The martial trend within American police agencies may have begun 
nearly twenty years prior to the events of 9/11, but the terrorist attacks and 
a decade of military conflict since bear significant responsibility for the 
widespread, integrated militarization of our nation’s law enforcement. Mili-
tary appearance, tactics, operations, weaponry and culture, including the 
rise and normalization of police paramilitary units, are all components of 
the country’s post-9/11 counterterrorism efforts and contributors to what 
may be viewed as an identity crisis among police officers. The crisis of iden-
tity arises when officers become torn between their sworn duty to protect 
and serve the community consistent with the tenets of the U.S. Constitution, 
on the one hand, and the national call to arms in the “war on terror” on the 
other. The tension experienced by many arises when officers must decide 
which interest receives their loyalty and which standard guides their choice 
of decision. Unfortunately, the increased militarization of America’s civi-
lian police force is impinging upon the professional ethics of its officers. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 652 
II.  MILITARIZING AMERICA ..................................................................... 653 
A. The Evolution of America’s Militarization ..................................... 654 
B. The Infusion of Militarization Across Society ................................ 657 
C.  Just War Theory on the Streets of America .................................... 661 
III. BLURRING THE LINES OF POLICE DUTY ............................................... 665 
A.  The Traditional Role of American Police ..................................... 665 
B. The Revised Role of American Police after 9/11 ............................ 669 
IV.  PAYING THE PRICE FOR DIVIDED LOYALTIES ..................................... 674 
V.  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 675 
  
 *   Copyright 2011, Cynthia A. Brown. Dr. Brown is an Assistant Professor of Legal 
Studies in the Department of Legal Studies at the University of Central Florida in Orlando, 
Florida. She wishes to thank Neal E. Trautman, Executive Director of the National Institute 
of Ethics. 
File: Brown 2 Created on:  5/7/2011 2:35:00 PM Last Printed: 5/22/2011 7:41:00 PM 
652 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. [Vol. 43 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From inception, organized civilian police forces have been distin-
guishable from the military—a design of deliberate distinction. Because 
early opponents feared civilian police forces would, in fact, be an extension 
of standing armies acting as secret spies, limiting individual freedoms and 
perpetuating governmental abuses, the introduction of an organized crime 
prevention body enabled with government authorized coercive power was 
quite controversial. Compared to increased crime, though, new police forces 
were eventually perceived as the lesser evil, and with reduced resistance, the 
creation of civilian police agencies quickly spread across America. Recent-
ly, the progression of the paramilitary character of the nation‘s civilian law 
enforcement and, conversely, the increasing law enforcement character of 
the military forces abroad,1 have provoked new heights of criticism within 
professional, academic and secular circles.  
A nascent realization is that America‘s law enforcement today may 
be confirming, in some respects, many of the original concerns of those 
opposing civilian police forces. Nearly two centuries since they were first 
voiced, issues like repressive criminal laws, abuse of governmental authori-
ty, and infringement on citizens‘ rights are sparking debate and being revi-
sited. The blurring of the constitutional and statutory principles that estab-
lished a bright line dichotomous model separating armed military forces 
from domestic civilian police is engendering a bevy of critical appraisal, not 
the least of which concerns law enforcement‘s digression from its profes-
sional code of ethics. 
The author hypothesizes that a significant expansion of militariza-
tion in America, particularly including normalizing the use of military–style 
tactics in mainstream police functions, undergirded by the theory of just 
war, is largely responsible for increases in unethical decision-making by 
  
 1 See Rachel Bronson, When Soldiers Become Cops, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 122, 122 (2002) 
(―Because the United States has no paramilitary units and only poorly organized civilian 
policing tools, elite combat forces have ended up filling the void.‖). Increasingly, American 
combat forces are called upon to handle civil strife in foreign countries where we have a 
military presence, mining soldiers in policing operations. The U.S. military, unfortunately, is 
poor-equipped to fulfill the responsibility of establishing post-conflict security in precarious 
political environments, often deemed peacekeeping and policing missions. Id. at 124–126. 
―On the war‘s international front, military interventions increasingly take the form of peace-
keeping police actions; while on the home front, the military are increasingly engaged or 
prepared for internal intervention and policing is progressively militarized [sic].‖ Jude 
McCulloch, Blue Armies, Khaki Police and the Cavalry on the New American Frontier: 
Critical Criminology for the 21st Century, 12 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 309, 310 (2004). A 
thorough analysis of soldiers‘ post-conflicting policing roles is outside the scope of this 
article. 
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police officers.2 Deluged by martial rhetoric, fear, and constant threat of 
harm, many law enforcement officers find themselves conflicted when con-
fronted by choices between professional ethics and their supposed obliga-
tions to wage ―war‖ on any number of valid concerns—crime, drugs, terror-
ism. This article considers what impact enlarged militarization and the ―just 
war‖ tradition may be having on those sworn3 to protect and serve. Part II of 
the article proceeds with an overview of the evolution and eventual expan-
sion of militarization within the United States and an introduction of just 
war theory. Part III examines both the traditional role of American law en-
forcement and the modern adaptations of the nation‘s civilian police force, 
particularly since September 11, 2001. Finally, the article concludes with 
thoughts about how the militarization of America—bolstered by the tradi-
tional just war principles—impinges on the professional ethics of law en-
forcement officers and may be responsible for an identity crisis among po-
lice.  
II. MILITARIZING AMERICA 
Considering the concept of militarization, it is probably advisable to 
first briefly introduce the broader notion of militarism. Militarism, original-
ly popularized in the 1860s, describes ―the adoption of war and military 
behaviors as ideals: the glorification of war and military power as ends 
themselves, as dominant or even defining values in a society in which the 
military establishment has disproportionate social and political influence 
  
 2 Kevin Johnson, Police Brutality Cases up 25%; Union Worried over Dip in Hiring 
Standards; Shortages may lead to “Scrimping” on Training, USA TODAY, Dec. 18, 2007, at 
1A. Kevin Johnson, a USA Today journalist, reports on an analysis of federal law enforce-
ment prosecutions compiled by Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse 
University (TRAC) report. Charges of excessive use of force and other tactics that violate 
civil rights have increased at least twenty-five percent since 2001. Id. 
 3 A typical example of a law enforcement officer‘s oath of office is: 
On my honor, 
I will never betray my badge  
my integrity, my character,  
or the public trust. 
I will always have 
the courage to hold myself 
and others accountable for our actions. 
I will always uphold the Constitution 
my community and the agency I serve. 
See International Association of Chiefs of Police [IACP], Presentation of the Oath of Honor, 
IACP, http://www.theiacp.org/PoliceServices/ExecutiveServices/ProfessionalAssistance/ 
Ethics/WhatistheLawEnforcementOathofHonor/PresentingtheOathofHonor/tabid/160/Defaul
t.aspx (2011). 
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relative to other elites or institutions.‖4 Speier defines militarism as existing 
―when the distribution of power and esteem assumes the form of centraliza-
tion of control, an attendant state monopoly of raising, controlling and 
equipping armies, and a universality of military mores.‖5 Militarization, on 
the other hand, occurs as a society adopts the tenets of militarism. Military 
historian Richard Khon suggests militarization is ―the degree to which a 
society‘s institutions, policies, behaviors, thought, and values are devoted to 
military power and shaped by war.‖6 Militarization is rooted in the notion 
that there may exist in a culture various ―customs, interests, prestige, ac-
tions, and thought associated with armies and wars‖7 but it all transcends 
true military purposes. The transcendence beyond the martial requirements 
makes these customs, interests, prestige, actions and thought irrelevant, un-
necessary, and, at times, even dysfunctional to war making.8  
A. The Evolution of America’s Militarization  
Until the first of the two World Wars, the ideals of war and peace 
were highly differentiated in the American experience. Any militarization 
was but a brief interruption during which citizens took up arms as the nation 
fortified for battle. As soon as the crisis passed, little time was wasted be-
fore civilians returned to their normal pursuits, and the government dis-
banded its defensive force, designed as a temporary creation that expired 
with the crisis.9  
The First World War, or the Great War, would nurture an American 
culture in the 1920s and 1930s profoundly influenced by thoughts of war 
and military intervention.10 Notwithstanding the nation‘s attentions on war, 
the United States had not yet moved toward militarization. That would 
  
 4 Richard H. Kohn, The Danger of Militarization in an Endless “War” on Terrorism, 73 
THE JOURNAL OF MILITARY HISTORY 177, 182 (2009). 
 5 HANS SPEIER, SOCIAL ORDER AND THE RISKS OF WAR: PAPERS IN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 
230 (1952). 
 6 Kohn, supra note 4, at 182. Professor Kohn derives his definition for militarization from 
descriptions previously provided by German historian Michael Geyer and Michael Sherry. 
Geyer Submits that militarization is ―the contradictory intense social process in which civil 
society organizes itself for the production of violence.‖ Michael Geyer, The Militarization of 
Europe, 1914–1945, in THE MILITARIZATION OF THE WESTERN WORLD 79 (John R. Gillis ed., 
1989). Sherry, on the other hand, suggests a broader meaning for militarization offering that 
it is ―the process by which war and national security became consuming anxieties and pro-
vided the memories, models and metaphors that shaped broad areas of national life.‖ 
MICHAEL S. SHERRY, IN THE SHADOW OF WAR: THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE 1930S XI 
(1995). 
 7 ALFRED VAGTS, A HISTORY OF MILITARISM: CIVILIAN AND MILITARY 13 (1959). 
 8 See id. 
 9 Kohn, supra note 4, at 184. 
 10 See id. at 185. 
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come as the conflict ended. World War I experienced renewed life through 
political issues further buoyed by the emerging conflict that culminated in 
another World War. The armed forces sought assistance from American 
businesses to mobilize industry and the national economy for the ensuing 
mass conflict. Both the governmental defense agencies and private enter-
prise worked to advance technologies and integrate improvements in Amer-
ica‘s military capabilities to ensure the nation‘s defense.11 World War I 
brought American government and business together in a partnership that 
gave rise to a military power that would become the ―Arsenal of Democra-
cy‖ in World War II.12 Because of this, World War I proved to be America‘s 
turning point toward militarization, taking ―a major and seemingly irrevoc-
able step in the direction of becoming a warfare or national security state.‖13 
In these ways and others, war and military gradually became a central para-
digm for the country,14 but it was not until the Cold War that the nation‘s 
expansive military establishment evolved into both a regular and prominent 
feature of American life. 
Threats of communist expansion, at a minimum, and nuclear as-
sault,15 at worst, characterized the Cold War and motivated efforts to ex-
pand the nation‘s conventional forces and upgrade her military readiness.16 
Much attention was centered on establishing a democratic presence along 
  
 11 See PAUL A. C. KOISTINEN, PLANNING WAR, PURSUING PEACE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF AMERICAN WARFARE, 1920–1939 xiv (1998). 
 12 Kohn, supra note 4, at 184. 
 13 KOISTINEN, supra note 11, at 298; see also, PAUL L MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE 
ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1979); NEIL A. WYNN, FROM 
PROGRESSIVISM TO PROSPERITY: WORLD WAR I AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (1986). 
 14 William E. Leuchtenburg, The New Deal and the Analog of War, in CHANGE AND 
CONTINUITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 81 (John Braemen, Robert H Bremner, & 
Everett Walters eds., 1964). 
 15 See Catherine Lutz, Making War at Home in the United States: Militarization and the 
Current Crisis, 104 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST 723, 727 (2002).  
U.S.-Soviet enmity became associated with a new mode of warfare. Termed ―nuc-
learism,‖ it was initiated in 1945 with the bombing of the U.S. western desert and 
then Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While technocentrism suggests that the new weapon 
and its massive destructive power were key to the transformation that began that 
year, what changed, more importantly, was the perception of danger among the 
people purportedly protected by nuclear weapons and the new social relations that 
emerged because of these weapons‘ manufacture . . . . This mode of warfare also 
spawned expanded codes of secrecy to protect the technical knowledge involved in 
weapons development . . . [and] also fundamentally deformed norms of democratic 
citizenship already under pressure from consumerist notions of self and eroded civ-
il liberties. 
Id. 
 16 Kohn, supra note 4, at 187. 
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the communist periphery.17 This was accomplished, in part, by constructing 
foreign bases in strategic locales.18 Additionally, diplomacy efforts concen-
trated on securing the ancillary programs and services necessary to reinforce 
America‘s global presence and advance American military power world-
wide.19  
At home, military services worked in tandem both with civilian 
groups and leading political figures to establish programs aimed at indoctri-
nating Americans in citizenship and national (including military) values ―to 
strengthen the national character and . . . to transform society along lines 
favorable to a martial mind-set.‖20 In less than a decade following World 
War II, the United States was a nation that had mobilized, at least psycho-
logically, for military conflict.21 
From the late 1940s through the 1980s, the need to combat the 
communist threat filled American life and fueled American politics. ―[T]he 
needs of the military establishment and the possibility of war pervaded the 
economy and American society more deeply, and for a more extended pe-
riod of time, than ever before, with the exception of those brief periods 
when the nation engaged in a shooting war.‖22 
Fears of internal subversion roiled the 1940s; antinuclear protests and an-
tiwar demonstrations recurred in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. For 
the first time on a continuing basis, military preparedness and spending, 
weapons systems, and the shape and character of the military establish-
ment periodically intruded into partisan politics and may have decided 
some elections. All sorts of domestic needs, from superhighways to the 
reform of education and even racial integration were justified by the over-
whelming need to combat the communist menace . . . . Many aspects of 
life in the United States came to be measured against the ability of Ameri-
cans to compete with communism: the divorce rate, race relations, worker 
  
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 LORI LYN BOGLE, THE PENTAGON‘S BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND: THE EARLY COLD 
WAR 16 (2004).  
 21 Kohn, supra note 4, at 190. The President of the American Historical Association in 
1949, argued ―We must clearly assume a military attitude if we want to survive . . . Total 
war, whether it be hot or cold, enlist everyone and calls upon everyone to assume his part . . . 
Confronted by such alternatives as Mussolini and Hitler and last of all Stalin have imposed, 
we must clearly assume a militant attitude if we are to survive . . . . This sounds like the 
advocacy of one form of social control as against another. In short, it is. But I see no alterna-
tive in a divided world. Probably in any planned world we can never be altogether free 
agents, even with our tongue and pen. The important thing is that we shall accept and en-
dorse such controls as are essential for the preservation of our way of life.‖ Conyers Read, 
The Social Responsibilities of the Historian, available at http://www.historians.org/info/ 
AHA_History/cread.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2011), cited in Kohn, supra note 4, at 190. 
 22 Kohn, supra note 4, at 188. 
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productivity, the moral fiber of American youth, even the viability of the 
American family itself.
23
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union, marking with it the end of the 
Cold War, would have seemingly eliminated America‘s need to prepare for 
war and its corresponding defense expenditures devoted to building and 
maintaining the military. That was not the case. Rather, there was an appar-
ent national agreement that the United States should take necessary steps to 
remain the world‘s dominant military power, a global superpower.24 Large 
numbers of veterans groups, which were formed after both World Wars, the 
Korean conflict, and the Vietnam War, pressed for massive defense expend-
itures.25 Industrial and business enterprises promoted military prepared-
ness.26 And, the Pentagon, of course, continually called for amplified de-
fense prowess.27  
By the late 1990s, America‘s military had grown and the nation‘s 
defense budget had swollen to three times the percentage of the gross do-
mestic product, a point that exceeded any other peacetime period in the 
country‘s history.28 Unknowingly, it would serve as a harbinger for what 
would come. After September 11, 2001, the nation‘s resolve for military 
domination grew even more resolute. The terrorist attacks on home soil 
brought an intensification of America‘s militarization that now dominates 
not only foreign relations but also all aspects of the country‘s domestic life. 
B. The Infusion of Militarization Across Society 
Over the last eighty years, the United States has experienced dec-
ades of depression, the Second World War, the Cold War, the Korean con-
flict, the Vietnam War, the Civil Rights Movement, and international pri-
  
 23 Id. at 190–91 (citations omitted). 
 24 The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, also known as the 
Hartman-Rudman Commission, completed the most thorough review of American national 
security in a generation and concluded the United States‘ budget in the late 1990s included 
military and defense expenditures that exceeded those of the next ten countries combined. 
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON NATIONAL SECURITY/21ST CENTURY, NEW WORLD COMING: 
AMERICAN SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 3 (1999). The next ten countries included Great 
Britain, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Tai-
wan. Id. The Commission also reported that the ―United States will remain the principal 
military power in the world . . . both absolutely and relatively stronger than any other state or 
combination of states.‖ Id. 
 25 Kohn, supra note 4, at 187. 
 26 Id. 
 27 ADAM YARMOLINSKY, THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT: ITS IMPACTS ON AMERICAN 
SOCIETY 13–15 (Harper & Row 1971). 
 28 Eliot A. Cohen, Defending America in the Twenty-first Century, 79 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
40–56 (2000). 
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macy. With each event came another degree of militarization expanding 
beyond anything experienced before in American history. This is no less 
true following the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Most certainly, the 
―war on terror‖ has proved to be an unprecedented contributor to America‘s 
militarization and, some would argue, digression toward militarism.  
―[E]very American is a soldier, and every citizen is in this fight,‖29 
declared President George W. Bush. Within days of the terrorist attacks the 
President addressed a Joint Session of Congress during which he declared 
that the United States ―will direct every resource at our command—every 
means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law 
enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of 
war—to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.‖30 The 
President warned ―this war [on terror] will not be like the war against Iraq a 
decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion . . . 
. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike 
any other we have ever seen.‖31 This and other martial rhetoric worked to 
militarize the whole of American society to the war paradigm. 
Bush‘s initial use of ―war on terror‖ in describing the United States‘ 
reaction to 9/11 was yet another illustration in a much longer list of exam-
ples in which America had begun applying ―war‖ metaphors to matters per-
ceived to be national problems: 
Declarations of war on social problems are dramatic events: they call for 
society to rally behind a single policy, against a common foe. Typically 
the initial pronouncements receive favorable attention in the mass media; 
the press details the nature of the problem and outlines the efforts designed 
to wage war against it. Usually, the enemy . . . has no one speaking on its 
behalf. There is the sense that society is united behind the war effort. Dec-
laring war seizes the moral high ground.
32
 
As early as the 1980s, Congressman Newt Gingrich was ―at war‖ 
with then Speaker of the House Tip O‘Neill. Preparing for battle, Gingrich 
spent two weeks at Fort Leavenworth studying military strategy. ―When 
asked if O‘Neill knew he was at war, Newt Gingrich replied: ‗if he doesn‘t 
he‘ll soon find out.‘‖33 Congressman Gingrich‘s foreboding came to fruition 
in the 1990s when he employed the war paradigm to help Republicans wrest 
  
 29 Elisabeth Bumiller, A Nation Challenged: The President; Bush Announces a Crack-
down on Visa Violators, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2001, at B5. 
 30 George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People 
(Sept. 20, 2001), http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0016.shtm. 
 31 Id. (emphasis added). 
 32 JOEL BEST, RANDOM VIOLENCE 144 (University of California Press 1999). 
 33 Kohn, supra note 4. 
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control of Congress from the Democrats.34 National politics became so bit-
ter and so polarized that one Republican senator described the atmosphere 
as ―trench warfare.‖35 
Space is another stage where militarization is visible. Established in 
1985, the U.S. Space Command is responsible for coordinating the space 
activities of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.36 The Space Command‘s ex-
Commander-in-Chief General Howell M. Estes III stated, ―As stewards for 
military space, we must be prepared to exploit the advantages of the space 
medium.‖37 Described as the ―fourth medium of warfare along with land, 
sea and air,‖ space is the dimension in which the country sought to achieve 
―Full Spectrum Dominance‖ allowing the ―U.S. military to dominate in any 
conflict, waged in any terrestrial or extraterrestrial medium.‖38 
One of the earliest continuing widespread uses of the war metaphor 
can be found in the ―war on drugs.‖39 In 1986, drug trafficking became a 
―national security‖ threat when President Ronald Reagan declared it to be 
so.40 With that, the war on drugs and the militarization of drug enforcement 
commenced. ―A ‗war on drugs‘ offers the opportunity for more money, 
more personnel, and more importantly, greater police powers.‖41 Writing on 
America‘s quest for prohibition, the late William F. Buckley Junior chal-
lenged America‘s ―wartime zeal, the legal equivalent of the My Lai massa-
cre.‖42 Despite the rhetoric, sensationalism, raging debates, and resources, 
  
 34 LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, AGAINST THE TIDE: HOW A COMPLIANT CONGRESS EMPOWERED A 
RECKLESS PRESIDENT 33 (Warner-Tamerlane Publishing Co. 2008); see also, ROBERT C. 
BYRD, LOSING AMERICA: CONFRONTING A RECKLESS AND ARROGANT PRESIDENCY 32–36 
(2004). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Jackie Orr, The Militarization of Inner Space, 30 CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY 451, 452 (2004). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 452–53. 
 39 President Richard Nixon first declared war on illegal drugs in response to the return of 
servicemen from Vietnam who came home with drug addiction problems. One in four ser-
vicemen were reported to have drug problems. See, JIM FISHER, SWAT MADNESS AND THE 
MILITARIZATION OF THE AMERICAN POLICE: A NATIONAL DILEMMA 9–10 (ABC-CLIO 2010). 
 40 FISHER, supra note 39, at 9. After President Reagan made drug enforcement a police 
priority, Congress passed the Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Act, allowing 
armed forces to assist civilian law enforcement agencies in drug enforcement. See also, John 
Paul & Michael L. Birzer, Militarization of the American Police Force: A Critical Assess-
ment, in CRIMINAL ABUSE OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN 17 (2010). 
 41 VICTOR E. KAPPELER, MARK BLUMBER, & GARY W. POTTER, THE MYTHOLOGY OF CRIME 
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 144 (Waveland Press 2000). Initially, the federal budget dedicated to 
the ―drug war‖ was an estimated $65 million. In 2009, the figure approached expenditures 
nearing $20 billion. 
 42 The War on Drugs Is Lost, NATIONAL REVIEW (July 1, 1996), http://www.national 
review.com/12feb96/drug.html. 
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the issues presented by selling, trafficking and using drugs remain unre-
solved. 
The war on drugs was becoming a ubiquitous metaphor, used by the me-
dia, politicians, and citizens in everyday talk and elaborated floridly in ref-
erences to ―battle plans,‖ ―fronts,‖ and ―enemies.‖ . . . Americans were 
finding ―wars‖ to wage all over their political and cultural agenda. As they 
did so, they marked the completion of the inward turn of militarization.
43
 
Utilizing the war metaphor for addressing national problems has 
been applied broadly and loosely. A New York Times editorial, in fact, 
called for a ―war on pet gluttony.‖44 The National Academy of Sciences 
issued a report that a quarter of the western world‘s household pets, specifi-
cally dogs and cats, were seriously overweight.45 Reporting on the story, a 
sardonic editorial took journalistic license with the much employed war 
metaphor.  
Evidence of the war paradigm further fueled by the ―war on terror‖ 
expands beyond employing war metaphors and into other areas of American 
culture. This century, the military began to rise to iconic status despite the 
fact that public trust in the federal government was declining dramatically. 
Veterans became revered as a constituency in both Congress and public 
rhetoric; Americans registered more trust and confidence in the military 
than any other institution.  
The media and Hollywood have aided both the acceleration and the 
pervasiveness of America‘s militarization. The television network CNN, for 
example, after 9/11 contributed to the branding of ―America‘s New War‖ by 
consistently airing the moniker in the fashion of a commodity.46 The major 
television networks jointly agreed in unprecedented fashion to carry only 
carefully edited versions of any videotaped statements from al-Qaeda in an 
effort to prevent the use of American television to broadcast coded messag-
es to followers.47 Filmmakers have also played a substantial role in further 
militarizing the nation after 9/11. In October 2001, Hollywood‘s studio ex-
ecutives offered to help the war efforts against terrorism through their film-
  
 43 MICHAEL S. SHERRY, IN THE SHADOW OF WAR: THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE 1930S 
431(Yale University Press 1997). 
 44 Porky Pets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at A18. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Catherine Lutz, Making War at Home in the United States: Militarization and the Cur-
rent Crisis, 104 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST 723, 731 (2002). 
 47 See, Clyde Haberman, A Nation Challenged: An Overview, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2001, 
at A1 and Oct. 12, 2001, at B7. U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice asked all 
five of the major television networks to assist the war effort by refusing to disseminate 
broadcasts that could contain coded messages or inflammatory propaganda. Id. 
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ing efforts.48 In fact, the script for the movie Black Hawk Down received 
editing by the White House and the Pentagon, and both worked closely with 
film producers in the production of the film.49  
Perhaps, one of the most significant effects of U.S. militarization is 
in the blurring of the boundary between policing and the military.50 The 
―war on terror‖ has exacerbated the weakening of these boundaries and 
caused the role convergence to be questioned. Additionally, the militariza-
tion of the nation and the terrorist targets identified in America‘s declaration 
of war strain the traditional justifications for waging war. Thus, administra-
tive efforts to craft a military agenda consistent with the concepts of ―just 
war‖ theory produce a circular effect. The martial rhetoric at the center of 
its efforts encourages a societal acceptance of the justification for our en-
gaging in military conflict. Such acceptance lends itself to further militariza-
tion feeding the continued distribution of a national call to arms.  
C.  Just War Theory on the Streets of America  
It was St. Augustine who provided the just war approach to the 
whole problem of war. Breaking with the tradition of Christian pacifism, St. 
Augustine interprets war along the lines inspired by the Old Testament.51 
When war is undertaken in obedience to God, who would rebuke, or hum-
ble, or crush the pride of man, it must be allowed to be a righteous war; for 
even the wars which arise from human passion cannot harm the eternal 
well-being of God, nor even hurt His saints; for in the trial of their pa-
  
 48 Hollywood Considers Role in War Effort, CNN (Nov. 11, 2001) http://articles.cnn.com/ 
2001-11-11/us/rec.hollywood.terror_1_war-effort-hollywood-community-families-need-
support?_s=PM:US (explaining the substance of the meeting between representatives of 
Hollywood‘s major studios and a delegation from the White House on how the entertainment 
industry could use its resources to aid the government‘s war on terrorism by shaping public 
perception). 
 49 See Adrian Brune, Protesting Black Hawk Down, THE NATION (Feb. 27, 2002), 
http://www.alternet.org/story/12508/protesting_black_hawk_down. 
 50 Carole Moore, When Good Cops Go to War, 34 LAW ENFORCEMENT TECHNOLOGY 80, 
83 (2007), available at http://www.officer.com/print/Law-Enforcement-Technology/When-
Good-Cops-Go-to-War/1$36967 (part of the problem stems from traditional close ties be-
tween the military and law enforcement. For years, agencies have targeted the U.S. Armed 
Forces as prime hunting grounds for new recruits. It makes perfect sense; the military in-
grains an understanding of chain of command, the ability to respond to dangerous situations 
both instantaneously and instinctively, and a knowledge of weapons and their use. Former 
military have a high success rate in law enforcement careers for all the reasons mentioned 
above. Additionally, they possess the right mindset—an appreciation of physical readiness 
and courage. Since they are predisposed to work well within a criminal justice structure, they 
often enjoy long and fruitful post-military careers as sworn officers). Id. 
Law-Enforcement-Technology/When-Good-Cops-Go-to-War/1$36967. 
 51 John Langan, The Elements of St. Augustine’s Just War Theory, 12 J. OF RELIGIOUS 
ETHICS 19, 20–21 (1984). 
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tience, and the chastening of their spirit, and in bearing fatherly correction, 
they are rather benefited then injured.
52
 
In the year 400 A.D., St. Augustine wrote to defend Moses and the 
wars of the Israelites in the vein of command ethics.53 His effort to defend, 
―with regret, the possibility that war may be just if it is waged in defense of 
the common good and to protect the innocent from certain destruction,‖54 
gave birth to just war theory and what would become the classic just war 
tradition.55 
Though often viewed as the Christian approach to the problem of 
violence, just war theory has arisen as the dominant ethical framework for 
considering war and has enjoyed a long and rich historical development.56 It 
is a theory articulated in the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice, taught 
at the U.S. military academies, and institutionalized in international law.57 
Just war theory is an approach for examining the justice of war, more so 
than a guide for determining whether any particular war is just. Nonetheless, 
modern just war theorists begin by asking, ―whether the cause is just.‖58 In 
order to be ―just,‖ proponents argue that the only unambiguous legitimate 
reason for the use of force is self-defense.59 Thus, in the name of self-
defense, just war theory permits armed aggression with force.60 The just war 
ethos does not allow for preventive war or revenge, but if an attack is immi-
nent, preemptive action is allowed to forestall the realization of the threat.61 
  
 52 St. Augustine, Contra Faustum Manichaeum, ¶75 in THE NICENE AND POST-NICENE 
FATHERS (Philip Schaff ed., 1887). 
 53 Langan, supra note 51, at 20. 
 54 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Reflections on War and Political Discourse: Realism, Just War 
and Feminism in a Nuclear Age, 13 POLITICAL THEORY 39 (1985). 
 55 Anthony Burke, Just War or Ethical Peace? Moral Discourses of Strategic Violence 
after 9/11, 80 INT‘L AFFAIRS 329, 336 (2004). 
 56 Neta C. Crawford, Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War, 1 PERSPECTIVES 
ON POLITICS 5, 6 (2003). Alternative ethics of war include militarism, which presupposes a 
right to war; pacifism, which denies any legitimation of warfare; realism, which postulates a 
reciprocal necessity for the right to declare war; and, idealism, which denies any fundamental 
right to war. William E Murnion, A Postmodern View of Just War, in A INTERVENTION, 
TERRORISM, AND TORTURE: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO JUST WAR THEORY 30 (S. P. Lee 
ed., 2007). 
 57 See Crawford, supra note 56, at 6. See generally LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY 
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (2000). ―Together with the Brussels and Hague treaties and the 
Geneva conventions . . . the measures adopted by the League of Nations and the United 
Nations . . . have institutionalized the just war ethic in international law.‖ Murnion, supra 
note 56, at 29. 
 58 Crawford, supra note 56, at 7. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
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A guide ―for assessing both the prospect of engaging in war and the 
merits of various forms of warfare,‖62 the just war theory‘s two primary 
prescriptions consist of (1) justifications for military action—when is war 
morally acceptable (jus ad bellum), and (2) moral limits on conduct (jus in 
bello).63 The first component of just war theory requires that war be the last 
resort undertaken by sovereign states.64 Operating within the theory‘s con-
straints then requires states to undertake serious inquiry into alternatives to 
military force.65 Non-military options, such as mediation and diplomacy, 
must generally be attempted prior to engaging use of force. Finally, the 
good that comes of the war must outweigh any harm caused by action.66 
 The second component of just war theory is based on the notions of pro-
portionality and discrimination.67 The violence delivered must be in direct 
proportion to the aims of the conflict. Discrimination, the admonition to 
avoid harm or injury to noncombatants, requires ―some sign of a positive 
commitment to saving [noncombatant] lives.‖68 
War is just if the cause and intention are just: namely, self-defense and the 
promotion of peace. War should be a last resort; it should be undertaken 
by competent authorities only if there is a possibility of success and if the 
overall good of the war will outweigh the harm it does. War must also be 
conducted justly: unnecessary violence should be avoided, and non-
combatants should not be deliberately targeted.
69
 
Most recently, the United States consciously structured its response 
to 9/11 and its counterterrorism strategies in just war terms, notwithstanding 
the fact that classic just war theory fails to acknowledge terrorists as legiti-
mate combatants.70 As employed by governmental executives, just war 
themes, such as self-defense, ongoing threats, and preemptive action, re-
main stubborn constituents in the administration‘s martial rhetoric. Fur-
  
 62 Murnion, supra note 56, at 23. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See id. 
 67 Crawford, supra note 56, at 7. 
 68 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL 
ILLUSTRATIONS 155–56 (4th ed. 2006). 
 69 Crawford, supra note 56, at 7. 
 70 The ideology or alternative ethic of war applicable to modern terrorism is that asso-
ciated with the idea of total war and is militarism. It is characterized by the complete mobili-
zation for war by a nation, indiscriminate attach upon combatants and non-combatants, and 
the employment of weapons of mass destruction. Id. at 5, 8. 
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thermore, by transforming terrorism into a new kind of war, the nation‘s 
leaders were better able to explain the ―war on terror‖ as a just response.71  
The ―Global War on Terror‖ was predicted to be unlike any the 
United States has experienced: ―indefinite in duration, fought less with mili-
tary forces than through intelligence, law enforcement, attacks on terrorist 
financing, diplomatic cooperation with allies, and a concerted effort to beef 
up homeland defenses.‖72 The change in threat perception motivated re-
structuring at the federal and state levels to help in the new battle.73 National 
security pervaded both domestic and foreign policy. The United States pro-
moted what it declared to be the universal values and norms of democracy, 
freedom, liberty, and human rights as the only true safety and manner of 
self-defense against terrorism.74 With self-defense as the national mantra, 
America proceeded to ―invade countries or overturn governments suspected 
of developing or possessing weapons of mass destruction and harboring or 
cooperating with terrorists—and would do so on the basis of a military su-
periority it intended to maintain.‖75  
Absent the ability to craft a new type of war designation for the war 
on terror, America‘s leaders were challenged to fit the new conflict within 
the confines of just war theory. By emphasizing the need for self-defense, 
the constant domestic threat assessment, perceived threat level, and a vigil-
ance against the certainty of additional attacks, the administration success-
  
 71 See Donald H. Rumsfeld & General Richard Myers, Briefing on Enduring Freedom, 
U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF. (Oct. 7, 2001), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx? 
transcriptid=2011.  
The only way to deal with the terrorists that has all the advantage of offense is to 
take the battle to them, and find them, and root them out. And that is self-defense. 
And there is no question but that any nation on Earth has the right of self-defense. 
And we do. And what we are doing is going after those people, and those organiza-
tions, and those capabilities wherever we‘re going to find them in the world, and 
stop them from killing Americans.  
Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with Wolf Blitzer, CNN, U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF., 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2221. What has been charac-
terized as the late modern or contemporary paradigm of just war arose in response to an 
expansion in militarism during the 19th and 20th centuries. See, JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST 
WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR: A MORAL AND HISTORICAL INQUIRY 229–77 
(1981). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Matthew C. Waxman, Police and National Security: American Local Law Enforcement 
and Counterterrorism After 9/11, 3 J. NAT‘L SEC. L. & POL‘Y 377, 381 (2009). Congress 
created the new Department of Homeland Security, consolidating approximately two dozen 
federal agencies, and the Department of Defense expanded its efforts domestically. Local 
governments began shifting personnel, budgetary and policy considerations to efforts to 
prevent and prepare for other potential terrorist attacks. Id. 
 74 Khon, supra note 4, at 197. 
 75 Id. 
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fully employed war rhetoric and propaganda ostensibly as a call to arms to 
all Americans as well all nations that oppose terrorism. This approach was 
necessary on numerous fronts. Complying with just war theory was essen-
tial to garner international support. It was also important in aligning the 
American people and her allies to the war effort.  
Doing what was necessary to validate military action after 9/11 was 
not without domestic consequences. Some of the most threatening conse-
quences can be seen in America‘s internal security; increased power in the 
presidency; a corresponding weaknesses in both Congress and the judiciary; 
a prominence of national security thinking and discourse; expanded surveil-
lance authority domestically; and correlated abuses of civil liberties for 
American citizens.76 In militarizing the threat of terrorism, the nation sanc-
tioned—and even requested—that law enforcement officers adopt a more 
militant role centered around the detection, capture, or destruction of the 
evil doers threatening the nation and the American way of life. Implicit was 
a message that unknown enemy combatants walking the streets of our 
communities and neighborhoods must be stopped. Arming police agencies 
with the responsibilities and latitudes of warriors substantially weakened the 
boundaries or demarcations that had segregated the military from the do-
mestic civilian peacekeepers we call police. 
III. BLURRING THE LINES OF POLICE DUTY 
A.  The Traditional Role of American Police  
As with America‘s common-law tradition, the modern origins of 
policing are directly linked to the nation‘s English heritage.77 In colonial 
America, the county sheriff, an appointee of the territorial governor, became 
the most important law enforcement agent in rural areas. His duties might 
include apprehending criminals, serving subpoenas, appearing in court, and 
collecting taxes.78 In the more populated areas, law enforcement duties fell 
to constables and the night watch.79 These were not the positions that gener-
  
 76 Id. at 198–200. 
 77 Craig D. Uchidah, The Development of the American Police: An Historical Overview, in 
CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 21(Roger G. Dunham & Geoffrey 
P. Alpert eds., 2005). 
 78 Id. at 23. A colonial sheriff received compensation on a per task basis, receiving higher 
fees based on the taxes collected. Consequently, other duties within the sheriffs‘ job descrip-
tion, including apprehending criminals, were of lower priority. Id. 
 79 Id. Both constables and the night watch carried out a variety of tasks that were broadly 
defined. For instance, constables were responsible for delivering suspects to court, eliminat-
ing health hazards and ensuring witnesses were in court. A typical inventory of responsibili-
ties held by the night watch included reporting fires, raging the hue and cry, maintaining 
streetlamps, arresting or detaining suspicious persons, and walking the rounds.  
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ally required great initiative or foresight. Rather, ―these men responded to 
criminal behavior only when requested to do so by victims or witnesses.‖80 
They were not required to prevent crime, discover criminal behavior, or act 
in any other ―proactive‖ manner.81 
The colonies became states, and the new nation expanded. The 
complexion of the country changed as did its requirements of law enforce-
ment. The arrival of foreign immigrants in search of a better life contributed 
to a swelling population. Turmoil grew as more and more workers com-
peted for both skilled and unskilled positions, and accompanying the in-
creased tensions came increasing numbers of social and economic conflicts. 
The constable-watch system was no longer adequate. Following the trend in 
Great Britain, the United States adopted a new police system based on the 
preventive model.82   
English magistrates Henry and John Fielding, Patrick Colquhoun, 
and philosopher Jeremy Bentham led efforts to create a professional police 
force that would have as its principal object the prevention of crime.83 They 
advocated that such a force would deter criminal activity and restore order.84 
English opponents feared an organized civilian police force too closely, 
resembled a standing army, and promised to provide the government with 
objectionable control over its citizens.85 Mounting disorder and escalating 
crime rates in London, however, eroded oppositional vigor and eventually 
swayed the debate in favor of the new police system.86   
Sir Robert Peel, England‘s Home Secretary, crafted the ideas of 
Fielding, Colquhoun, and Bentham into London‘s first Metropolitan Police 
Act.87 He succeeded in convincing Parliament that the proposed police force 
was needed, and he led the early formation of the new force.88 In so doing, 
  
 80 Uchidah, supra note 77, at 23. 
 81 Id. at 23. 
 82 See generally ROGER LANE, POLICING THE CITY: BOSTON, 1822–1885 (1967); JAMES F. 
RICHARDSON, THE NEW YORK POLICE: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1901 (1970) ; WILBUR R. MILLER, 
COPS AND BOBBIES: POLICE AUTHORITY IN NEW YORK AND LONDON, 1830–1870 (1977); 
SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM: THE EMERGENCE OF 
PROFESSIONALISM (1977); 3 LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND 
ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750: CROSS-CURRENTS IN THE MOVEMENT FOR THE REFORM OF 
THE POLICE (1956); CHARLES REITH, A NEW STUDY OF POLICE HISTORY (1956); T. A. 
CRITCHLEY, A HISTORY OF POLICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES (Patterson Smith 1972) (1967). 
 83 Uchidah, supra note 77, at 24. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 ROY ROBERG, KENNETH NOVAK, & GARY CORDNER, POLICE & SOCIETY 34 (2009).  
 88 Id. Peel‘s success followed an arduous toil fraught with resistance. He worked for over 
seven years to secure the political support necessary to enact the Metropolitan Police Act and 
it nearly cost him his life. After Parliament‘s heated debate over the proposed legislation and 
 
File: Brown 2 Created on: 5/7/2011 2:35:00 PM Last Printed: 5/22/2011 7:41:00 PM 
2011] ETHICAL CHALLENGES 667 
Peel created the first organized English metropolitan police force and the 
forerunner to modern-day police, as well.89 Peel is credited for orchestrating 
and securing his force‘s legitimacy in the eyes of the English citizens it 
served.90 He was able to accomplish this in part by selecting officers who 
were reserved in demeanor; choosing uniforms that were unassuming; in-
sisting that the officers be restrained and polite; and by barring officers from 
carrying guns.91 The ―bobbies‖ or ―Peelers,‖ governed by rules of law and 
empowered by the institution of government, succeeded in gaining public 
approval.92   
America may have followed in the footsteps of Great Britain, but 
the nation‘s first police departments refrained from embracing the British 
model in its entirety, choosing instead to borrow selectively from it.93 The 
greatest similarity was perhaps in the adoption of the preventive patrol idea. 
Americans agreed that a police presence through patrol would deter crime 
and maintain order. A significant departure, however, was that the Ameri-
can police systems favored the decentralization and democratic participation 
of local and municipal governments.94 Initially, the police were an extension 
not of local government, but of the different political factions that made up 
municipal government.95 It was the local political leaders in a particular 
ward or precinct that recruited and selected police officers.96 Rather than 
  
its passage, Daniel M‘Naghten made an attempt to kill Peel, fatally shooting his secretary by 
mistake. M‘Naghten‘s notoriety extends further linked to the insanity defense that bears his 
name. See PHILIP P. PURPURA, POLICE AND COMMUNITY: CONCEPTS AND CASES 10 (2001). 
 89 Id.; see also A. GERMANN, F. DAY & R. GALLATI, INTRODUCTION TO LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 62 (1974). Although Peel hoped the planned civilian police organiza-
tion would be established across the whole of Great Britain, initially the new force‘s imple-
mentation was limited to metropolitan London. By the 1850s, however, every county and 
borough in England had assembled a civilian police force. See H. A. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 173–75 (1988); D. R. JOHNSON, AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT: A 
HISTORY 20–21 (1981). 
 90 Id. at 12–13. Peel restricted Police involvement in political activity and required all 
appointments to be on the basis of merit instead of patronage. These requirements of neu-
trality legitimized the police force such that journalists commented that the police, ―know[s] 
nothing of politics; the man in blue always preserves his neutral tint.‖ A. GERMANN, F. DAY 
& R. GALLATI, INTRODUCTION TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 62 (1974). 
 91 Id. at 3, 12–13. Peel‘s system required officers to maintain strict impartiality to gain 
public acceptance.  
 92 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. The London citizenry began affectionately 
referring to police officers as ―bobbies‖ or ―Peelers.‖ The ―bobbies‖ moniker continues to-
day. GERMANN, supra note 90, at 62.  
 93 MILLER, supra note 82 at 132. 
 94 Id. at 18–19. 
 95 Id. at 16–17. ―Police were initially appointed by the aldermen of the wards in which 
they were to serve and had a fixed term of office. . . Police became a political issue.‖  
 96 Id. 
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relying on formal institutional power, like that of their English brethren, 
American police trusted the informal control of individual authority.97 Each 
police officer was responsible for establishing his own authority among the 
citizens he patrolled rather than on drawing on institutional legitimacy like 
that accomplished by Peel. 
From the middle of the eighteenth century through the 1920s, poli-
tics dominated American policing, and the period was dubbed the ―Political 
Era.‖ What developed during this time was aptly named the political model 
of policing.98 Officers enjoyed a great deal of discretion and ability to exer-
cise authority. Consequently, political and economic corruption was a 
common occurrence in police departments during this period. The police 
departments, often vital components in the political machine‘s ability to 
maintain political control, turned a blind eye when they did not openly sanc-
tion the corrupt practices of their officers.99 Officers, as well, tended to sup-
port the machine and its boss, in part because they were beholden to them 
for their jobs, but also because many shared the perspectives of the machine 
and boss they served.100  
Reform was not an option, and cleaning up the corruption became a 
predominant focus of the reform era. Between the 1920s and the 1960s, 
policing experienced what has been described as the most significant period 
in the development of law enforcement in the United States.101 It was during 
this period that the foundations for the professionalization of policing 
  
 97 Id. 
 98 ROY ROBERG, KENNETH NOVAK, & GARY CORDNER, POLICE & SOCIETY 39 (2009). There 
was little that escaped the reach of politics; every aspect of law enforcement—who I was the 
hired, who was promoted, who was selected as chief, who was appointed to the police com-
mission—was a decision dictated by politics. See also PHILIP T. PURPURA, POLICE AND 
COMMUNITY 18 (2001).  
 99 ROBERG ET AL., supra note 98, at 41. 
100 Id. Graper writes, 
Only in recent years has it come to be recognized that something more than a po-
lice manual, a uniform, a club, a revolver, and a fair degree of brute strength is 
needed to transform a recruit into an efficient policeman. Heads of police depart-
ment‘s have too often been appointed for political considerations and have acted on 
the principle that party loyalty constituted the highest qualification required for the 
appointment of subordinates. Tenure of office, dependent largely upon party suc-
cess, was apt to be brief and therefore stimulated the use of every opportunity for 
gain. This produced collusion with criminals and police corruption that mar the po-
lice records of many American cities. As aptly put by a prominent chief of police, 
―This was the era of instability, immigrants, vitality, and graft.‖  
ELMER GRAPER, American Police Administration 108 (1921). 
101 ROBERG ET AL., supra note 98, at 42. 
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emerged, and the legalistic model provided the preeminent thinking about 
police work.102  
Commissions organized and financed by private citizens conducted 
investigations to expose corruption within government and its subdivisions, 
including police departments.103 Efficient and centralized administrations 
committed to professionalism began replacing the political meddling that 
had so dominated the political era.104 Professionalism included the adoption 
of a code of ethics, improved police behavior and performance, better selec-
tion and training of officers, and enhanced management of police agen-
cies.105   
Since the 1970s American policing has been operating within what 
Kelling and Moore denominate as the ―Community Era‖ of law enforce-
ment.106 The political era, characterized by decentralized and neighborhood-
oriented policing, facilitated pervasive corruption. To address this, the 
reform era that followed focused on distancing police officers from the 
community, restraining discretion, and formalizing operations, a strategy 
that had its own weaknesses. Subsequently, the community era developed in 
response to defects in the reform period, including a return to developing 
relationships between the police and the citizens. Relatedly, policing in this 
era touts a problem-solving approach to crime and community problems. 
The influencing philosophy is known as community policing.107 Simulta-
neously, the subversive movement is increased militarization. 
B. The Revised Role of American Police after 9/11 
Prior to 1980, a strict demarcation between the police and the mili-
tary existed, not only in America, but also in a host of democracies of the 
Anglo-American tradition.108 While there are elements shared by both sys-
tems, the divide is made more distinct with the understanding that the opera-
tional and philosophical principles guiding each differ,109 as do their mis-
  
102 Id. Other names for the legalistic model include the professional model, the bureaucratic 
model, the reform model, and the quasi- or semi-military model. Id. 
103 PURPURA, supra note 98. 
104 Id. 
105 ROBERG ET AL., supra note 98, at 42. 
106 George L. Kelling & Mark H. Moore, The Evolving Strategy of Policing, 4 
PERSPECTIVES ON POLICING (1988). 
107 See PURPURA, supra note 98, at 245–78. 
108 McCulloch, supra note 1, at 310.  
109 Id. 
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sions, rules of engagement, risk management practices, and standard operat-
ing procedures.110  
The military, employed almost exclusively against external enemies 
in times of war, are trained to kill by the use of overwhelming force.111 The 
objectives of military forces are directed toward the capture or destruction 
of assets, and any level of force necessary to achieve the objectives is autho-
rized.112 Police, on the other hand, enforce laws and keep the peace applying 
the minimal force necessary, bound by law to ensure civil liberties and pro-
tect life.113 The goals of law enforcement center around the capture of crim-
inal suspects in order to bring them to trial, and employing force to achieve 
the goal is permissible only if it is reasonable and in compliance with strict 
guidelines.114  
Military rules of engagement allow for the (accidental) killing of non-
combatants, and have a restricted concept of ―rights‖ for civilian popula-
tions. Law enforcement rules of engagement are strictly constrained by the 
constitutional rights of everyone involved—including the perpetrator, and 
they place paramount importance on saving lives—again, including the 
perpetrator‘s.
115
  
Notwithstanding unambiguous dividing lines, mission creep occurs, 
though it is typically characteristic of the totalitarian or authoritarian re-
gimes. The closer the operational and ideological relationship between the 
police and the military, the more nearly a society approaches a totalitarian 
governance.116 Since 9/11, America has experienced an arguably dangerous 
weakening of the traditional separation between these two occupations, a 
blurring of the boundary lines separating the military and the police, and a 
move toward, rather than away from, a more authoritarian dispensation. The 
nature of policing in the 21st century is changing.117 
Even before 9/11, study results indicated a spread of militarization 
to domestic civilian law enforcement fueled, in part, by militaristic training 
  
110 Ralph Mroz, Are You an LE Professional? How About Your Instructors?, POLICE 
OFFICERS SAFETY ASSOC. (Feb. 7, 2011, 11:25 PM), http://www.officer.com/online/article. 
jsp?id=51445&siteSection=30&&cPage=2&OrderBy=InsertDate&Dir=ASC. 
111 McCulloch, supra note 1, at 310.  
112 Ralph Mroz, Militarization of Civilian LE? Don’t Believe the Hype, POLICE OFFICERS 
SAFETY ASSOC. (Feb. 7, 2011, 11:25 PM), http://www.officer.com/web/online/POSA 
Militarization-of-Civilian-LE/30$48667. 
113 McCulloch, supra note 1, at 310.  
114 Mroz, supra note 112. 
115 Id. 
116 See McCulloch, supra note 1, at 310–11 (citations omitted). 
117 Peter B. Kraska, Militarization and Policing – Its Relevance to 21st Century Police, 1 
POLICING 501, 502 (2007). 
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provided by military and ex-military instructors.118 The end of the Cold War 
and the disarming of the communist threat left many military and ex-
military professionals in need of a purpose. The military industrial complex 
lacked external enemies to mobilize against, making it easier to focus on 
internal conflicts and internal ―enemies‖—dangerous offenders, rioters and 
drug dealers—as the new national threat.119 In many instances, domestic 
civilian police forces provided a new outlet both for military personnel and 
surplus equipment.120 America‘s internal security forces helped fill yet 
another void of the post-Cold War era, the loss of a national moral impera-
tive, a distinction previously held by America‘s drive to defeat communism. 
Taking the place of anti-communism campaigns, drugs and crime stepped in 
and emerged as the nation‘s new moral imperatives.121 Through drugs and 
crime, a national purpose and unification was constructed ―allowing for 
extreme measures to be taken in order to ‗fight‘ the feared enemy.‖122 The 
nation‘s civilian police officers manned the ―front lines‖ of America‘s new 
conflict. 
  
118 See Peter B. Kraska, Questioning the Militarization of U.S. Police: Critical Versus 
Advocacy Scholarship, 9 POLICING AND SOCIETY 141, 143 (1999). Kraska provides: 
 U.S. military special operations active-duty soldiers provide training to nearly 
half of all large and small department police paramilitary units (PPUs). 
 Three years of field research . . . and an exhaustive examination of magazines 
and literature from the practicing SWAT community have demonstrated that the 
highly popular militaristic subculture surrounding military special operations teams 
such as the Navy Seals and Army Rangers also provides the central ideological 
fuel driving PPU subculture. 
 The U.S. military in an attempt to become more ―socially useful‖ in the post-
cold war era is donating or selling a massive amount of military weaponry, surplus, 
and technology to the police institution (e.g., armored personnel carriers, M-16s, 
night vision technology, fatigues, etc.). 
 The U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of Justice have collabo-
rated in numerous joint technology, weaponry, personnel transference, and training 
programs. 
Id. at 143–44 (citations omitted). 
119 Sergio Herzog, Militarization and Demilitarization Processes in the Israeli and Ameri-
can Police Forces: Organizational and Social Aspects, 11 POLICING AND SOCIETY 181, 202 
(2001). 
120 See generally, MICHAEL S. SHERRY, IN THE SHADOW OF WAR: THE UNITED STATES SINCE 
THE 1930S (1995) (discussing Militarization in the U.S. since 1933). 
121 ETHAN A. NADELMAN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S. 
CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 475 (1993) (―Where once anticommunism represented the 
principal moral imperative of U.S. foreign policy, drug enforcement and other criminal jus-
tice objectives have emerged as the new moral imperatives.‖). 
122 Peter B. Kraska, Crime Control as Warfare: Language Matters, in MILITARIZING THE 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 18 (Peter B. Kraska ed., 2001) (Professor Kraska and 
his colleagues performed groundbreaking research that addresses the concepts of militariza-
tion and militarism and the shadow they cast on the nature of policing today). 
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After 9/11, the law enforcement personnel heard a similar and more 
urgent directive—straight from the White House. Our nation‘s Commander 
in Chief appealed to the police for assistance in fighting a new kind of war 
that had been brought to the streets of America by a global enemy. While 
the martial trend prior to 9/11 may have been disquieting, the integration of 
the military model into today‘s police force is even more disturbing. 
The ―war on terrorism‖ influenced a new, heightened militarized 
role for America‘s police agencies.123 Local police forces mobilized in sup-
port of national efforts to combat terrorist threats.124 In actuality, terrorism 
on U.S. soil had not been a priority issue.125 In the wake of the tragedies, 
however, terrorism rose to become the preeminent priority. President Bush 
declared that ―[e]very American is a soldier,‖126 including the domestic civi-
lian police forces, further endorsing a national warrior culture.  
Police departments began purchasing military armored personnel 
carriers (APCs) with the assistance of homeland security funding.127 Some 
agencies are actually using these vehicles for aggressive, proactive patrol 
work,128 deploying APCs for ―street sweeps‖ in high-crime neighborhoods, 
manned with SWAT personnel in full paramilitary uniforms and weapo-
nry.129 No-knock or quick-knock raids are becoming more prevalent for the 
purpose of collecting evidence from private residences.130 Frequently, offic-
ers conduct these raids during predawn hours, attired in black military Bat-
  
123 The terror attacks on 9/11 were not the first time local police have been called to ―war.‖ 
Following World War I, J. Edgar Hoover‘s Bureau of Investigation (the precursor to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation) had police agencies conduct ―Palmer Raids‖ on suspected 
radicals for Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer. Thousands of immigrants across the Unit-
ed States were subjected to violent warrantless arrests and targeted for deportation for sus-
pected radical political beliefs. Thirty years later the FBI sought police assistance in monitor-
ing subversive political groups that included many participants in the civil rights movement. 
Matthew C Waxman, Police and National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and 
Counterterrorism After 9/11, 3 J. OF NAT‘L SECURITY LAW & POLICY 377, 379 (2009). 
124 Id. A mid-1990s survey revealed that less than 40 percent of state law enforcement 
agencies and only approximately one-half of local police agencies had no plans for dealing 
with terrorist threats. Id. at 381. Acts of terrorism were typically addressed by criminal sta-
tutes and treated as crimes rather than acts of war. 
125 See Laura K. Donohue & Juliette N. Kayyem, Federalism and the Battle over Counter-
terrorist Law: State Sovereignty, Criminal Law Enforcement, and National Security, 25 
STUD. IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1, 1 (2002) (recalling that ―a new threat to U.S. security‖ 
emerged following incidents including the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing). 
126 Bumiller, supra note 29, at A1. 
127 Kraska, supra note 117, at 507. 
128 Charlie Dietch, Military Police, PITTSBURGH CITY PAPER, at 1–3 (2007). 
129 Kraska, supra note 117, at 507. 
130 Id. 
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tle Dress Uniforms (BDUs), hoods, and military helmets.131 Often, battering 
rams, entry explosives, or flash-bang grenades are employed to disorient the 
occupants before officers begin a frantic room-by-room search of the resi-
dence.132 These officers ―derive their appearance, tactics, operations, wea-
ponry, and culture to a significant extent from military special operation 
units,‖133 like the Navy Seals. In the wake of 9/11, ―[t]he rise and normali-
zation of police paramilitary units [such as these examples] is one dimen-
sion of the blurring boundaries in the U.S. government‘s police/military 
security apparatus.‖134 
Post-9/11 counterterrorism efforts are occurring in the midst of the 
community policing era,135 furthering the militarization/democratization 
paradox. In fact, the two forces run counter to each other. One explanation 
for the dual existence may be found in a second or later strand of communi-
ty policing that is moving to the forefront today. It ―has in many instances 
transformed into a zero-tolerance policing model [and a rise in paramilitary 
policing], where the police strictly enforce all infractions of law and order 
using an array of aggressive tactics such as street sweeps, proactive en-
forcement of not just the law but community order, and a proliferation of 
drug raids on private residences.‖136 Such macro-level changes in criminal 
justice practices remain contradictory and potentially volatile. Further, the 
ongoing conflict and continuing threats associated with the ―war on terror‖ 
encourage rather than discourage the martial trends. 
Political scientist Harold Lasswell warned that protracted military 
crises may blur civilian and military functions through a ―socialization of 
danger‖ in which freedoms are replaced by compulsions, and obedience and 
service become the cardinal values. It is a time when propaganda characte-
rizes government communications and guides morale. ―All organized social 
  
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 506. 
134 Kraska, supra note 118, at 144. 
135 Community policing is actually an old idea that has been revitalized, revised, and ex-
panded. Its roots are found in early England, the Peelian Reform Movement in England, the 
urban neighborhood foot patrol officer, and the small town police officer who, even today, 
communicates with residents, knows almost everybody, and works with ―the locals‖ to solve 
problems and maintain order. See RONALD D. HUNTER, POLICE COMMUNITY RELATIONS AND 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 190–197 (8th ed. 2011).  
136 Kraska, supra note 118, at 509. There are two competing strands of community-oriented 
policing. Police reformers Radelet and Trojanowicz promoted the contrarian approach con-
sisting of community empowerment, cultivating constructive relationships with disenfran-
chised minority groups, and establishing partnerships between the public and the police. The 
objective was to achieve communities in which the residents policed their own community. 
Id. 
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activity will be governmentalized,‖137 more closely regimented, and centra-
lization becomes paramount.138 These words may have been written nearly 
nine decades ago, but their cautions resound poignantly in 21st century 
America. 
IV.  PAYING THE PRICE FOR DIVIDED LOYALTIES 
Singularly, either militarization or the just war ethos can signifi-
cantly influence an officer‘s perspective and conduct. In tandem, however, 
the combined effect may exact a high cost where an officer‘s ethical respon-
sibilities are at issue. The effect justifies, if not encourages, hyper-
enforcement thinking and action enhancing the probabilities that officers 
will adopt a ―means-justifies-ends‖ rationale for their conduct. A transfor-
mation from ―Officer Friendly‖ into ―Officer Rambo‖139 becomes not just 
possible but probable.  
This article suggests that the incongruity of professional police eth-
ics and the federal ―war on terror‖ produces an identity crisis for the na-
tion‘s domestic security force. Law enforcement officers experience a sense 
of divided loyalty—on one hand each has taken an oath to protect and serve 
and uphold the Constitution,140 and on the other hand, each has received a 
call to wage war on home soil against an enemy combatant committed to 
harming all of America. Though domestic national security efforts involv-
ing local police agencies are not, in and of themselves, in conflict with law 
enforcement‘s code of ethics, they represent a value system that does con-
flict with the police ethic. Wars are fought by soldiers authorized to use 
extreme force, to kill, and to do what is necessary to prevail over the enemy. 
Police officers possess no necessity to ―defeat an enemy.‖141 The national 
agenda may broadcast a fight between right and wrong or a battle of the just 
versus the unjust, but a state of moral confusion arises for police officers 
who find themselves caught between the two value systems and required to 
make a decision. 
Relatedly, there is a condition known as ―fog of war.‖142 The term 
refers to the combination of a number of factors that may impair an individ-
ual‘s ability to make proper ethical judgments under pressure. In the ―war 
  
137 Harold S. Lasswell, The Garrison State, 46 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 455, 462–63 (1941). 
138 Id. at 67. 
139 See Ken Adachi, Sanctioned Torture and Summary Execution in America, available at 
http://educate -yourself.org/pnt/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 14, 2011). 
140 See International Association of Chiefs of Police, supra note 3. 
141 Ted A. van Baarda, Military Ethics in Peacekeeping and in War: Maintaining Mora 
Integrity in a World of Contrast and Confusion, available at http://www.jha.ac/articles/a 
129.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2011). 
142 Id. (discussing ―fog of war‖). 
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on terror‖ as waged by law enforcement officers on the streets of America, 
harmful factors to ethical decision making may include a sense of national-
ism, fear, stress, frustration, and fatigue. Application of the concept ―fog of 
war‖ is not limited to armed conflict on the battlefield, and it certainly en-
capsulates the differences between what may be considered morally accept-
able on the battlefield as opposed to the ethically appropriate behavior off 
the battlefield. Again, conflicting value systems and incompatible ethical 
considerations can tear at an officer who finds himself doing battle on the 
streets, pulling him in different directions, and reducing the predictability of 
his conduct.143 
V. CONCLUSION 
In addition to what some classify as a role reversal,144 civilian law 
enforcement officers in America today are facing a crisis of identity. Torn 
between their sworn duty to protect and serve the community consistent 
with the tenets of the U.S. Constitution or the national call to arms in the 
―war on terror,‖ many officers become conflicted in deciding which interest 
receives their loyalty and which standard guides their choice of decision. 
Unfortunately, too often it is the police organizational culture that sabotages 
its officers and presents the most significant obstacle to change.145  
The specter of the military model ―haunts the real world of contem-
porary policing, despite the recent rhetoric of democratic reforms.‖146 Police 
at every level are habituated to act and to think consistent with militaristic 
principles. The pervasive expansion of a larger paramilitary culture 
throughout the United States since 9/11 provides sustaining effects for the 
retention of war/military paradigm as an authoritative framework for crime 
control thinking—not just in the ranks of the nation‘s civilian police force 
but also among politicians, bureaucrats, the media, and the public. 
 
  
143 Id. 
144 See generally, Donald J. Campbell & Kathleen M. Campbell, Soldiers as Police Offic-
ers/Police Officers as Soldiers: Role Evolution and Revolution in the United States, 26 
ARMED FORCES & SOCIETY 227 (2010). 
145 See generally, Eugene A. Paoline III, Taking Stock: Toward a Richer Understanding of 
Police Culture, 31 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 199 (2003); Eugene A. Paoline III, Shed-
ding Light on Police Culture: An Examination of Officers’ Occupational Attitudes, 7 POLICE 
QUARTERLY 205 (2004); Eugene A. Paoline III, Stephanie M. Myers, & Robert E. Worden, 
Police Culture, Individualism, and Community Policing: Evidence from Two Police Depart-
ments, 17 JUSTICE QUARTERLY 575 (2000); and Steve Herbert, Police Subculture Reconsi-
dered, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 343 (1998). 
146 Peter B. Kraska & Louis J. Cubellis, Militarizing Mayberry and Beyond: Making Sense 
of American Paramilitary Policing, 14 JUSTICE QUARTERLY 607 (1997). 
